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Submitted: 13 July 2025, Revised: 19 February 2026, Accepted: 3 March 2026.

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Policy & Governance Review

ISSN 2580-4820

Vol. 10, Issue 1, pp. 103-115

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.30589/pgr.v10i1.1279>

Assessing Collegial Collective Leadership and Capacity Building to Strengthen Institutions: Insights from the Indonesian Parliament

Abstract

This study tested collegial collective leadership in the Indonesian Parliament and its influence on institutional capacity within a coalition-based political system. It explores whether parliamentary leadership effectiveness stems from individual authority or from structured, collective mechanisms embedded in partisan dynamics, and adapts the transformational leadership theory to a legislative context. This research employs a qualitative descriptive approach and content analysis, drawing on secondary sources, notably peer-reviewed articles. Data were collected from databases, namely Scopus, Web of Science, and Google Scholar, using keywords such as “collegial leadership,” “collective leadership,” “parliament,” “transformational leadership,” and “institutional capacity.” Findings reveal a hybrid leadership model: authority is formally shared among the Speaker and deputy speakers and exercised through commissions, inter-faction consultations, and plenary consensus, but coalition strength strongly shapes the policy outcomes. Transformational leadership dimensions appear institutionally: idealized influence and inspirational motivation are dispersed across party hierarchies; individualized consideration is limited; and intellectual stimulation, embedded in commission scrutiny and iterative policy review, most strongly enhances the institutional capacity. The study concludes that parliamentary leadership depends on structured deliberation, coordination, and coalition stability rather than on charismatic authority. Institutional strengthening requires the reinforcement of deliberative procedures, transparent coordination, and systematic learning mechanisms.

Keywords: collegial collective leadership; capacity building; institutional strengthening; Indonesia

Introduction

Leadership has long been a central concern in public administration and governance, particularly regarding the performance and capacity of public institutions. In democratic systems, leadership is widely regarded as a key factor in shaping institutional effectiveness, legitimacy, and responsiveness. Accordingly, a substantial body of research examines how various leadership approaches influence organizational performance and governance outcomes (Filgueiras et al., 2023; Pierre, 2022). Within this literature, leadership is

consistently identified as a critical determinant of institutional capacity, contributing not only to goal attainment but also to organizational adaptation, learning, and long-term stability. In addition, several of these discourses focus on specific leadership attributes, such as ethical orientation, charisma, and strategic vision, often conceptualized through established theoretical frameworks. Among these, Transformational Leadership by Bernard M. Bass and Ronald E. Riggio has been specifically influential (Bass & Riggio, 2006). This theory, which emphasizes transformational leadership, stresses four core dimensions: idealized influence, inspirational motivation, intellectual stimulation, and individualized consideration. These dimensions have been widely applied to explain how leaders foster commitment, innovation and institutional development.

Moreover, in public sector research, transformational leadership has primarily been examined in hierarchical, individual leadership settings where authority is relatively centralized and leadership roles are clearly defined. Consequently, limited attention has been devoted to its relevance in collective and collegial leadership arrangements, particularly within legislative institutions. In contrast, parliamentary leadership differs significantly from executive leadership: authority is typically dispersed, decision-making is collective, and leadership functions are embedded in formal institutional rules rather than concentrated in a single actor. These characteristics raise essential theoretical questions regarding the applicability and adaptation of transformational leadership in collegial settings in higher education. Previous studies have demonstrated that leadership styles interact with organizational characteristics to shape institutional outcomes. As evidence, research by Berman et al. (2021) and Jacobsen et al. (2022) yields the importance of leadership in navigating organizational complexity and institutional change, where, the governance scholars similarly emphasize leadership's role in sustaining stable governance structures and managing political and administrative challenges (Crewe, 2021; Tomsa & Bax, 2023; Trondal, 2023; van der Voet & Steijn, 2021). Collectively, these studies suggest that leadership frameworks must be sufficiently flexible to account for diverse organizational forms and governance structures.

Nonetheless, in the context of the Indonesian parliament, however, leadership has often been addressed in fragmented or descriptive terms, with limited theoretical engagement (Feulner, 2024; Sinaga & Machmud, 2024). Existing research tends to focus on institutional performance, capacity building, and legislative effectiveness without systematically examining leadership as a collective practice grounded in established leadership theory. Even recent studies that underline challenges in institutional capacity, human resources, and leadership development do not fully explore how collective leadership structures operate or how they may align with transformational leadership principles (Beiser-McGrath et al., 2022; Coppedge et al., 2011; Hermanto et al., 2024; Kovusov et al., 2023). This gap in the literature highlights the need for a more focused examination of leadership within legislative institutions from a collective perspective. Specifically, there is limited understanding of how the dimensions of transformational leadership manifest in collegial collective leadership models and how such models contribute to institutional capacity.

Based on this, this study attempts to address this gap, allowing leadership to be analyzed not merely as an individual attribute but as an institutional and collective process embedded in parliamentary governance. In summary, this study examines the collegial collective leadership model in the Indonesian parliament through the lens of transformational leadership. It seeks to contribute to leadership theory by extending transformational leadership to a collective institutional setting and legislative studies by providing a more systematic understanding of leadership and institutional capacity.

Finally, the study is guided by three research questions: (1) What are the characteristics of collegial collective leadership in the Indonesian parliament when examined through the four dimensions of transformational leadership? (2) To what extent does collegial collective leadership contribute to institutional capacity in terms of adaptation, learning, and legislative performance? (3) Which dimension of transformational leadership is the most significant in strengthening institutional capacity within this collective leadership model?

In summary, this study integrates transformational leadership theory with collective leadership

practices in the legislative context. This offers a clearer theoretical foundation for comprehending leadership in parliamentary institutions and provides insights relevant to institutional development and governance reform.

Methods

This study employed a qualitative descriptive approach and content analysis. This basis was chosen to “Assessing Collegial Collective Leadership and Capacity Building to Strengthen Institutions: Insights from the Indonesian Parliament.” According to Creswell & Báez (2020), the application of qualitative descriptive methods and content analysis enables the researcher to analyze the area or phenomena of interest actively. The outcomes of this study will inform the researcher in achieving complete information in line with the study’s purpose. Furthermore, the data for this study were collected from secondary sources, and their validity was confirmed through a scientific database (e.g., Scopus, WoS, and Google Scholar) that aligned with the research theme. In addition, to retain objectivity, validity, reliability, and coherence, the researcher selected scientific information to support the analysis, which classified, categorized, and synthesized the data and information, thereby reducing bias in interpretation based on the research theme. Literature searches were conducted using search strings such as “collegial leadership”, “parliament,” “collective leadership,” “legislative institutions,” “transformational leadership,” “institutional capacity,” “Indonesian parliament,” and “leadership.

Hence, this study presents a theoretical approach and empirical integration; this basis might examine the concept, model, and framework related to the research theme based on the identified background gap. In line with that comment, Creswell & Clark (2017) explicitly describe the flow of this process, aiming to find new insights and to provide a new paradigm for the research’s implications, with continuity for the prospect through the empirical recommendation. In addition, the study also applied the data technique from the five-stage approach by Creswell & Poth (2016) as follows:




Figure 1. Creswell Analysis Model
Source: Author Visualization, (2025)

First, the researcher emphasized the problem of the study; from here, the core of the problem, namely, the gap in recognition of the collegial collective effects on institutional strengthening in the Indonesian parliament, was explored and identified. Second, the literature review enables the researcher to identify the theoretical concepts underlying the research theme and systematically synthesize them to support the research problem with scientific literature. Third, the position on data collection: here, the researcher attempts to collect and organize the data to support the flow from the theoretical concept and examine the findings in relation to the research theme. Fourth, for interpretation, the researcher will present the analysis findings or the study’s implications to provide meaningful information for both the researcher and readers. Five reports were delivered. In this context, the researcher sought to comprehensively summarize the study’s conclusions and offer future recommendations from a scientific perspective. To enhance rigor, this study applied transparent inclusion criteria, systematic coding procedures, and iterative cross-checking between themes and source material. While this study does not claim statistical generalizability, its methodological transparency assists in analytical credibility, coherence, and replicability within qualitative research standards.

Results and Discussion

Characteristics of Collegial Collective in the Indonesian Parliament

In this section, the researcher reveals the characteristics of the collegial collective leadership. The literature review shows that leadership practices in the Indonesian Parliament diverge from the core assumptions of transformational leadership conceptualized by Bass and Riggio (2006). In addition, transformational leadership presumes iden-

tifiable authority, a leader-follower relationship, and the capacity of a central figure to shape the collective direction through charisma, inspiration, intellectual stimulation, and individualized consideration. However, parliamentary data indicate that decision-making processes are formally organized through collegial mechanisms, including committee deliberation, inter-faction negotiation, proportional leadership distribution, and consensus-based plenary procedures. Authority is institutionally distributed rather than concentrated on individuals. The researcher argues that transformational leadership does not adequately explain the parliamentary context. Transformational leadership assumes a clearly identifiable leader who can shape the collective direction through charisma, inspiration, intellectual stimulation, and individualized consideration. However, parliamentary data show that authority is not concentrated in a single individual but is distributed across institutional structures. Decision-making occurs through committee deliberations, inter-faction negotiations, proportional leadership arrangements, and consensus-based plenary procedures, all of which limit the dominance of any one actor. Political legitimacy is grounded in representation, party mandates, and adherence to formal rules, rather than personal appeal. Policy outcomes emerge from bargaining and compromise within established procedures rather than from the vision of a central figure. Furthermore, the institutional design ensures continuity, regardless of who occupies leadership positions. For these reasons, researchers contend that a distributed or institutional leadership perspective offers a more convincing explanation than a leader-centered transformational model.

Nonetheless, the scientific findings do not deny the existence of power concentration. On the contrary, voting alignments, agenda-setting practices, and leadership allocation patterns demonstrate that the party that wins the legislative election and holds the presidency exerts substantial influence over parliamentary decisions (Bolukbasi & Yildirim, 2022; Coppedge et al., 2011; Luzkow, 2021; Sørensen & Ansell, 2023). The inspection shows that executive-backed legislation is prioritized in the legislative agenda, coalition parties dominate key parliamentary leadership positions, and voting cohesion within the governing blocs remains consistently high. These

measurable patterns confirm that while procedures are collegial in form, substantive political power is asymmetrically distributed along the partisan lines. Therefore, collegial collective leadership operates within a dominant party power structure rather than a politically neutral environment.

Regarding the first research question, the four dimensions of transformational leadership manifest in modified and structurally constrained forms. Regarding idealized influence, the findings do not demonstrate the presence of a singular parliamentary leader who commands institution-wide loyalty. Parliamentary leaders are constitutionally equal to other members and lack the authority to direct or sanction them. Instead, influence flows primarily through party hierarchies and coalition agreements. This confirmation aligns with Bennister (2021) and Johansson (2022), who argue that transformational leadership models encounter structural limitations in non-hierarchical democratic institutions. Thus, scientific evidence indicates that idealized influence is diffused across party structures rather than embodied in parliamentary officeholders. With respect to inspirational motivation, the findings show that the collective vision in Parliament emerges from a negotiated compromise rather than from individual visionary leadership.

Hence, plenary debates and commission reports reveal that the policy direction reflects factional bargaining and coalition settlements. While this process strengthens representational legitimacy, it often yields diluted or fragmented policy narratives when dominant party interests conflict with minority positions. It confirms that inspirational motivation in parliamentary settings is contingent on political bargaining rather than on emotional mobilization by a single actor (Koistinen & Vuori, 2024; Santoso, 1995). The dimension of intellectual stimulation is observable in committee hearings, expert consultations and deliberative review processes. Parliamentary commissions regularly engage specialists, civil society actors and government representatives during bill discussions. However, the results also demonstrate fragmentation across commissions and limited cross-body coordination. The presence of “multiple centers of leadership,” as reflected in distributed commission authority, constrains unified strategic direction (Flavin,

2024). Moreover, when the executive coalition strongly backs the legislation, the amendment space narrows and deliberative autonomy decreases. Thus, intellectual stimulation exists institutionally but is bounded by partisan alignment.

Finally, individualized consideration appears to be the least compatible with the parliamentary structure. Leaders cannot provide personalized mentorship or developmental oversight because there is no hierarchical relationship between members. Professional development occurs indirectly through committee assignments, party structures, and procedural participation, rather than through personal guidance from parliamentary leaders. Johansson (2022) notes that, in democratic institutions, leadership development is structurally mediated rather than individually driven. In conclusion, these findings answer the first research question by demonstrating that collegial collective leadership in the Indonesian Parliament reflects procedural equality but operates under partisan asymmetry. Transformational leadership dimensions are present only in institutionally mediated forms and are constrained by the constitutional design and party dominance.

The second research question examines the extent to which collegial collective leadership contributes to institutional capacity, which is defined as adaptation, learning, and legislative performance. The empirical findings indicate that collegial procedures enhance institutional stability and facilitate the management of coalitions. Broad-based negotiation mechanisms reduce overt conflict and enable flexible realignment when political coalitions shift. It supports arguments within distributed leadership theory that shared authority structures can promote adaptive governance (Gherghina, 2025; Masongo & Omondi, 2024). Institutional learning is evidenced through procedural reforms, improved documentation systems and iterative adjustments to legislative workflows across parliamentary terms. Commission-level deliberation enables the technical refinement of bills and the incorporation of expert feedback. However, adaptation and learning are not independent of the political context.

The results show that major legislative initiatives often originate from executive proposals and that parliamentary responsiveness correlates

with coalition alignment. Thus, institutional capacity is shaped by the interaction between collegial coordination and dominant party influence, as further illustrated by legislative performance indicators. Executive-sponsored bills enjoy higher passage rates and faster deliberation timelines than non-coalition initiatives. This suggests that efficiency is closely linked to partisan configuration rather than solely to collegial cooperation. While collegial leadership sustains procedural legitimacy and inclusiveness, policy outcomes are significantly influenced by electoral legitimacy and executive-legislative alignment (Bolukbasi & Yıldırım, 2022; Coppedge et al., 2011; Sørensen & Ansell, 2023). Therefore, collegial collective leadership contributes to institutional capacity primarily through coordination and negotiation stability, but it does not neutralize the underlying power asymmetries. In short, the analysis emphasized that collegial collective leadership should be re-evaluated and calibrated to build a strong foundation, thereby enhancing institutional capacity and supporting the Indonesian parliament.

The third research question concerns which dimension of transformational leadership most significantly strengthens institutional capacity within the collective model. Based on the results, intellectual stimulation emerged as the most consequential dimension. Committee-based scrutiny, policy debates, and expert consultations are associated with measurable improvements in legislative quality and technical coherence. Amendment records and revision processes demonstrate that deliberative engagement enhances policy design, even when final approval reflects coalition discipline. Inspirational motivation contributes indirectly by sustaining coalition cohesion, but its institutional effect depends on partisan agreement rather than on visionary leadership. Idealized influence remains diffused within party hierarchies and, therefore, exerts a limited direct effect on parliamentary capacity.

Individualized consideration shows minimal structural relevance because of the absence of a hierarchical authority. Consequently, among the four dimensions, intellectual stimulation manifested through structured deliberation has the strongest empirical association with strengthening institutions. The key message is that intellectual stimulation is

the most essential dimension of transformational leadership for strengthening institutional capacity in this collective model. Structured deliberation, such as committee scrutiny, policy debates, and expert consultations, directly improves legislative quality and coherence. The other dimensions (inspirational motivation, idealized influence, and individualized consideration) have weaker or more indirect effects on institutions. Critically, this suggests that institutional strengthening does not primarily depend on charismatic authority or hierarchical influence, but on procedural mechanisms that encourage analytical engagement. While inspirational motivation is relevant for maintaining coalition cohesion, it contributes only indirectly to institutional capacity. Its effects depend on partisan agreement and political alignment, rather than institutional reform. Similarly, idealized influence is diffused within party hierarchies and therefore lacks a direct and traceable impact on parliamentary performance. Individualized consideration appears structurally marginal in this context because collective legislative bodies lack the vertical authority structures in which such personalized leadership typically operates.

However, the prominence of intellectual stimulation also reveals a limitation: institutional capacity improvements are tied to the quality of the deliberative culture. However, when debate becomes symbolic or excessively partisan, the benefits may diminish. Thus, while intellectual stimulation emerges as the strongest empirical predictor of institutional strengthening, its effectiveness depends on the integrity and depth of the deliberative processes.

In summary, the results shift attention away from leader-centric explanations toward procedural and collective dynamics as the primary drivers of institutional development, and the findings demonstrate that leadership in the Indonesian Parliament is best understood as constrained collegial collective leadership embedded within a dominant-party political framework. Formal procedures distribute authority horizontally, but electoral results and coalition dominance shape substantive agenda control and legislative outcomes (Bennister, 2021; Gherghina, 2025; Masongo & Omondi, 2024). By integrating transformational leadership theory

with perspectives from distributed leadership and democratic institutional analysis, the findings assert that institutional capacity emerges not from individual charisma alone but from leaders' ability to foster critical engagement across formal structures of governance.

This study underscores that effective parliamentary leadership is fundamentally procedural and collective. Transformational leadership achieves its strongest institutional impact when it is aligned with distributed decision-making and embedded deliberative mechanisms. Fostering a culture of rigorous debate and critical scrutiny within formal structures, rather than concentrating authority in individual leaders, is the key driver of sustainable institutional strengthening, offering conceptual and empirical insights into the dynamics of democratic governance.

Collegial Collective to Strengthen Institutional of the Indonesian Parliament

These results show that leadership in the Indonesian parliament is formally structured as a collegial collective arrangement comprising one speaker and four deputy speakers, each vested with constitutionally equivalent authority under parliamentary rules. Official documents and procedural guidelines consistently frame leadership decision-making as being consultative and consensus-oriented. Interview respondents confirmed that leadership meetings are conducted through deliberation (*musyawarah*) and are expected to produce collectively endorsed decisions rather than unilateral ones. These findings indicate that, at the formal level, the Indonesian parliament's leadership architecture reflects the principles of collective authority and shared responsibility. However, scientific evidence also demonstrates that this formal collegiality operates within a broader political structure characterized by asymmetrical party power, as noted in the previous analysis. Parliamentary records, coalition agreements, and leadership allocation patterns reveal that the distribution of strategic positions, including committee chairs and legislative agenda-setting roles, closely corresponds to the electoral strength of parties in the governing coalition.

In particular, sessions related to priority bills

show an alignment between parliamentary outputs and the executive's policy platform. Testimonies from both majority and minority faction members confirm that when disagreements arise, the coalition supporting the president typically possesses sufficient numerical strength to secure the desired outcomes. These findings suggest that while authority is procedurally distributed among the five leaders, effective decision-making capacity is still affected by the dominant coalition aligned with the presidency. Therefore, collegial collective leadership in the Indonesian parliament should be understood as a procedural and institutional design embedded within, rather than independent of, prevailing party power relations. Regarding institutional adaptive capacity, the evidence indicates a dual pattern. On the one hand, formal consultation requirements encourage cross-faction dialogue and reduce the likelihood of abrupt unilateral leadership decisions. Meeting minutes and scheduling records indicate that major legislative initiatives are preceded by coordination meetings among leaders and faction representatives. This inclusiveness supports political stability and mitigates institutional conflict. On the other hand, the selected legislative processes show that extensive consultation often prolongs deliberation.

In addition, it acknowledged that urgent bills, specifically those requiring rapid executive-legislative coordination, often face procedural delays because of the need to build consensus across leadership nodes and coalition partners. A comparative review of bill-passage durations shows that politically sensitive legislation requires significantly longer negotiation periods than technical or low-contestation bills. These findings suggest that collegial leadership enhances procedural inclusivity but may constrain adaptive speed when a rapid institutional response is necessary.

In detail, institutional learning capacity refers to the presence of horizontal mechanisms for knowledge exchange. The observations indicate that policy discussions frequently involve peer-to-peer deliberation rather than directive instructions from a dominant leader. The dispersion of authority across the speaker and deputy speakers facilitates multiple communication channels between the factions and committees. Parliamentary staff reported that informal

coordination among leadership offices enabled the circulation of policy information and updates on negotiations.

Nevertheless, an analysis of reform initiatives and follow-up actions reveals inconsistencies in long-term institutional learning. Several reform proposals discussed at leadership forums were not systematically institutionalized or monitored after the initial agreement. Hence, this was attributed to fragmented coordination responsibilities and shifting political priorities within the coalition. Thus, while horizontal interactions promote plural perspectives and shared deliberation, they do not automatically generate sustained institutional learning without structured follow-through mechanisms. Legislative performance presents the clearest illustration of the tension between the representational legitimacy and operational efficiency. Voting records and plenary transcripts describe broad factional participation in leadership deliberations, reinforcing the representative nature of parliamentary governance. The collegial structure ensures that multiple political parties are symbolically and procedurally integrated into the decision-making process. However, a review of legislative output across sessions indicates fluctuations in bill completion rates, particularly during periods of coalition realignment or political contestation. Moreover, the absence of a clearly dominant internal parliamentary authority can complicate coordination during negotiations. When coalition interests diverge, leadership deliberations may drag on for a long time before reaching a compromise. These patterns suggest that collegial collective leadership strengthens representational legitimacy but does not consistently enhance the legislative efficiency. Importantly, the results do not support the interpretation that collegial collective leadership independently determines institutional capacity. Instead, institutional outcomes appear to be mediated by the interaction between formal leadership arrangements and underlying party dominance.

Nonetheless, evidence from agenda-setting procedures and final voting alignments indicates that when strategic executive interests are at stake, coalition discipline tends to override collegial deliberative norms. In such cases, collective leadership mechanisms function more as negotiation arenas than

as autonomous centers of authority. This dynamic underlines that formal equality among parliamentary leaders does not eliminate asymmetrical political influence, which is rooted in electoral outcomes and coalition control.

Based on this, from a theoretical standpoint, these scientific results suggest that transformational leadership dimensions, such as inspirational motivation, intellectual stimulation, individualized consideration, and idealized influence, operate within the structural constraints imposed by party systems and executive-legislative relations. While elements of inspirational rhetoric and consensus-building are observable in leadership interactions, their impact on institutional strengthening depends on political alignment, and coalition stability. The most significant contribution to institutional capacity appears to stem from intellectual stimulation, which is reflected in deliberative exchanges that generate policy alternatives and cross-faction dialogue. However, without coordinated institutional mechanisms, such deliberations do not consistently translate into improved adaptive performance or long-term reform consolidation. In summary, the observations indicate that collegial collective leadership in the Indonesian Parliament contributes positively to inclusiveness, coalition management, and representational legitimacy. Simultaneously, it imposes measurable constraints on adaptive speed, coordinated institutional learning, and legislative efficiency. Thus, institutional capacity in the Indonesian Parliament emerges from the interplay between collegial design, coalition dominance, and executive influence rather than from the collective leadership structure alone. By situating collegial leadership within observable power relations and documented procedural practices, this analysis clarifies that the Indonesian parliament leadership model is neither purely egalitarian nor purely hierarchical but structurally hybrid, formally collective, and substantively conditioned by concentrated political power.

Ultimately, the Indonesian Parliament's leadership model embodies a structurally hybrid form: formally collective but substantively conditioned by concentrated political powers. Its effectiveness in strengthening institutional capacity depends not only

on collegial procedures but also on their interaction with coalition dynamics and executive influence. Transformational leadership qualities, such as intellectual stimulation and consensus-building, are visible but bounded by political alignment, suggesting that institutional outcomes are contingent on the interplay between formal authority and the practical realities of party-dominated governance.

Insight Recommendation for the Indonesian Parliament

This section provides an analysis that clearly distinguishes scientific findings from interpretive arguments and situates collegial collective leadership within the actual power structure of the Indonesian parliamentary system. These observations indicate that while the Indonesian parliament formally adopts a collegial collective leadership structure exercised through multiparty leadership boards and commission chairs, the exercise of influence is embedded within party-based hierarchies and governing coalitions. Thus, collegiality operates within, rather than outside, broader political power configurations. The confirmation of scientific evidence from legislative deliberations and decision-making procedures demonstrates that parliamentary leadership is institutionally designed to distribute authority across factions. Leadership positions in the speaker's office and parliamentary commissions are allocated proportionally among political parties based on electoral strength. This perspective suggests a pragmatic comprehension of parliamentary leadership: it is both collaborative and competitive, guided by formal rules that ensure representation while maintaining party influence. Therefore, collegiality operates as a structured process rather than a purely voluntary practice entwined with the broader political configuration of the legislature.

Moreover, the institutional design assists a collegial framework, as decision-making formally requires consultation and consensus across all factions. However, the inspection also shows that legislative outcomes are strongly shaped by the governing coalition, particularly when the party or coalition aligned with the president holds a majority or near-majority seat. In a few cases, agenda-setting

power and policy prioritization reflect executive preferences, especially in strategic legislation such as budget approvals, omnibus laws, and national development planning statutes. Hence, the detection of collegial collective leadership in this context does not deny the dominance of electoral winners or executive-legislative alignment. Rather, the findings indicate a dual structure in which formal collegial mechanisms coexist with asymmetrical political influence. Parliamentary leaders operate within consensus-oriented procedures; however, these procedures are conditioned by coalition discipline and party negotiation. The consideration highlights the enduring influence of the governing coalition, particularly when aligned with the president, which can shape legislative agendas and prioritize executive preferences (Fefta Wijaya et al., 2023).

In addition, the inspection reveals that even when final votes reflect coalition dominance, internal negotiations within the leadership board and inter-faction meetings often precede the formal plenary approval. These negotiation processes constitute observable manifestations of collegial interactions, albeit within a power environment shaped by party hierarchy. Hence, the analysis of transformational leadership dimensions is grounded in this context, which reveals academic debates. Among the four dimensions—idealized influence, inspirational motivation, intellectual stimulation, and individualized consideration—evidence suggests that inspirational motivation is the most adaptable within Indonesia’s parliamentary structure. Meeting transcripts, public speeches by parliamentary leaders, and cross-faction coordination forums demonstrate a recurring emphasis on shared national objectives, legislative responsibility, and institutional credibility. These discursive patterns reflect collective vision-building rather than individualized charismatic authority. Unlike executive systems, in which a single leader can mobilize subordinates through a hierarchical command, parliamentary leaders must frame legislative agendas in ways that resonate across party lines. This pattern is consistent with documented cases of cross-party agreements on national priorities, even when substantive disagreements remain. Simultaneously, the inspection reveals structural limits to other transformational dimensions. Idealized

influence, which in classical theory presumes moral authority concentrated in a single figure, is diluted in a multi-leader system. The researcher stresses that, unlike classical models of idealized influence, where moral authority is centralized and highly personalized, authority in parliamentary contexts is distributed among leaders and factions. This diffusion limits the capacity of any individual to exercise a singular transformative influence.

Intellectual stimulation primarily occurs within commission deliberations; however, coalition agreements often moderate its impact on final policy outputs. Individualized consideration is constrained by the scale and complexity of parliamentary organizations, where leadership interacts more frequently with factions than with individual members. This suggests that thoughtful debate and innovative ideas must operate within the constraints of political compromise and collective bargaining. Additionally, the researcher emphasizes that the sheer scale and complexity of parliamentary organizations limit the individualized consideration of members’ input.

These findings were derived from observable institutional practices rather than normative assumptions. In line with that, to address the concern about power denial, it is important to clarify that coalition dominance significantly shapes institutional capacity. Statistical patterns of bill passage during periods of strong executive coalitions indicate higher legislative productivity but also reduced amendment acceptance from opposition factions. This suggests that adaptation and learning occur within coalition-defined boundaries. Therefore, institutional capacity is not merely a function of collegial interaction but also of political alignment. However, coalition dominance does not eliminate the operational relevance of collegial leadership. Instead, it redefines its function: collegial processes serve to manage intra-coalition coordination and maintain procedural legitimacy in the presence of majority control.

The contribution of collegial collective leadership to institutional capacity can be empirically observed in three areas: adaptation, learning, and legislative performance. Adaptation is visible in procedural reforms, such as adjustments to digital deliberation mechanisms and commission

restructuring in response to the complexity of policies. These reforms required coordination across factions and leadership boards, indicating that collegial negotiations facilitated institutional adjustments. Learning processes are reflected in the iterative revisions of major legislative drafts, where input from multiple commissions and expert hearings influenced the final formulations. Although coalition preferences set a broad policy direction, deliberative forums allow for technical refinement and policy correction. Legislative performance, measured by the number of enacted laws and the timeliness of budget approval, improves during stable coalition periods. However, the qualitative dimension of performance, notably the inclusiveness of debate, varies depending on political alignment. Inspirational motivation appears to be the most significant factor in strengthening institutional capacity because it operates at the level of a shared institutional narrative rather than at the level of individual authority. The analysis of plenary speeches indicates a repeated framing of parliamentary work as a collective responsibility toward national development and democratic consolidation, a rhetorical pattern that contributes to institutional coherence, especially when public trust fluctuates. In a horizontally structured body where no single actor commands full authority, articulating a common purpose becomes a functional necessity.

The scientific literature suggests that when parliamentary leaders consistently invoke shared institutional goals, cross-factional collaboration improves during committee negotiations, even in the face of political competition. Nevertheless, the analysis acknowledges that inspirational motivation does not neutralize structural inequality in the distribution of power. The governing coalition's numerical strength continues to determine the outcomes of contested legislation. Inspirational motivation contributes not to the equalization of power but to the stabilization of interaction. This helps sustain procedural commitment and reduces overt fragmentation. In this sense, motivational leadership reinforces institutional continuity, rather than redistributing authority. This interpretation aligns with broader studies of Indonesian constitutional practice, which note the strong influence of executive–legislative coalitions in shaping parliamentary decisions (Butt & Murharjanti,

2022; Zamjani, 2022). Rather than contradicting these findings, the present analysis complements them by demonstrating how leadership practices function within that structure. The Indonesian parliament cannot be understood solely as a site of executive dominance or a collegial deliberative forum; it embodies both characteristics simultaneously. Recognizing this hybrid reality reduces the argument's vulnerability to criticism. These findings have important implications for institutional development within parliamentary systems characterized by coalition politics and distributed authority. Strengthening institutional capacity in this context does not require a fundamental redesign of constitutional arrangements. Rather, it must be to reinforce the procedural infrastructure that sustains transparent and accountable cross-faction deliberation, and enhancing the systematic documentation of committee debates would strengthen institutional memory and policy continuity, enabling legislators to make more informed, historically grounded decisions.

Similarly, expanding structured avenues for expert participation through hearings, advisory panels, and commissioned research can deepen the analytical quality of legislative outputs while preserving political accountability. In a sense, formalizing inter-faction consultation mechanisms is equally significant. Clear procedural guidelines for negotiation and agenda coordination may reduce informal power asymmetries and foster more predictable cooperation patterns. Such reforms acknowledge the enduring realities of coalition discipline while seeking to channel them through more transparent processes. Simultaneously, leadership development initiatives should prioritize competencies suited to collective governance. Training that emphasizes consensus-building, negotiation strategy, and articulation of a shared vision would better reflect the institutional logic of parliamentary leadership than models centered on hierarchical command.

Finally, these findings refine the theoretical integration of transformational leadership and collective legislative governance. It does not portray collegial leadership as detached from political dominance; instead, it conceptualizes collegiality as a procedural layer operating within coalition-based power structures. Inspirational motivation emerges as

the most structurally compatible dimension because it assists in shared orientation without presupposing centralized authority.

In summary, this study underscores that collegial leadership functions as a stabilizing force rather than a redistributor of power. Coalition strength continues to dictate legislative outcomes, but shared framing, structured consultation, and inter-faction dialogue preserve institutional coherence, and procedural continuity. This dual reality, in which formal collective mechanisms coexist with asymmetrical influence, reveals the hybrid nature of parliamentary governance. Recognizing this connection allows leadership approaches to emphasize negotiation, vision articulation, and cross-party coordination. Ultimately, the Indonesian parliament exemplifies how collegial leadership, when aligned with coalition realities, can strengthen institutional resilience, support adaptive policymaking, and sustain credible, collaborative legislative practice.

Conclusion

The central message of this study is that collegial collective leadership in the Indonesian Parliament functions as a procedurally structured system embedded within coalition-based power dynamics. Institutional capacity is not primarily generated by individual charisma or hierarchical authority but by the quality of deliberative mechanisms and negotiated coordination among political actors. Transformational leadership remains analytically useful, yet its relevance in parliamentary settings lies in its institutionalized and collective dimensions rather than personalized leadership. Several major findings emerged from this analysis.

First, the Indonesian Parliament reflects a structurally hybrid leadership model: formally collective but substantively influenced by partisan asymmetries. Authority is constitutionally distributed among the Speaker and deputy speakers, and decisions are reached through commission deliberations, inter-faction consultations, and plenary consensus. However, legislative agenda control and policy outcomes are significantly shaped by governing coalition strength and executive collegiality; therefore, structures and procedures shape the former, while coalition dominance shapes the latter.

Second, the four dimensions of transformational leadership, as conceptualized by Bernard M. Bass and Ronald E. Riggio, manifest in institutionally mediated forms. Idealized influence is dispersed across party hierarchies, rather than being embodied in a single parliamentary actor. Inspirational motivation arises from negotiated institutional narratives that emphasize collective responsibility over charismatic mobilization. Individualized consideration is structurally limited in a horizontally organized legislature that lacks hierarchical leader–follower relationships. Intellectual stimulation emerges as the most consequential dimension, embedded in commission scrutiny, expert consultations, and iterative policy reviews. This illustrates the clearest relationship with improvements in legislative coherence and analytical rigor.

Third, collegial collective leadership contributes to institutional capacity, primarily through coordination, stability, and representational legitimacy. Adaptation occurs through negotiated procedural reforms and structural adjustments in response to changing policy demands. Institutional learning is evident in iterative legislative drafting and cross-faction engagement. Legislative performance tends to improve under stable coalition conditions but fluctuates during periods of political fragmentation. Therefore, institutional capacity results from the interaction between deliberative procedures and coalition alignment rather than from collegial design alone.

Theoretically, this study suggests that transformational leadership theory must be recalibrated to apply to collective legislative institutions. Leadership effectiveness in parliamentary contexts depends less on centralized authority and more on structured deliberation and on relational coordination. When embedded in formal procedures, intellectual stimulation can serve as a structural driver of institutional strengthening without requiring charismatic dominance. Practically, strengthening the Indonesian Parliament should focus on reinforcing deliberative infrastructure, improving documentation and monitoring systems, and formalizing transparent inter-faction coordination. Institutional learning benefits from systematic follow-up mechanisms for reform initiatives. Leadership development programs should emphasize negotiation skills, consensus building,

and the articulation of shared institutional purposes consistent with collective governance dynamics.

This study has several limitations that open avenues for future research. First, it relies primarily on qualitative descriptive and content analyses and is based on secondary sources. Future studies should incorporate longitudinal quantitative data to test the causal relationship between deliberative intensity and legislative performance across parliamentary terms. Second, the findings are specific to Indonesia's coalition-based party system. Comparative research across parliamentary systems with different electoral designs or party fragmentation levels would clarify the generalizability of the hybrid collegial model identified in this study. Third, while intellectual stimulation appears to be most strongly associated with institutional strengthening, further empirical investigation is needed to assess how variations in deliberative quality, notably levels of polarization or procedural transparency, affect long-term institutional resilience. Future research should explore how digital parliamentary reforms, public participation mechanisms, and evolving executive-legislative relations reshape collegial leadership practices. By extending the analysis across temporal and comparative dimensions, scholars can deepen their understanding of how collective leadership models adapt to changing democratic environments.

In summary, this study highlights that collegial collective leadership stabilizes parliamentary governance and supports institutional resilience, yet operates within enduring structures of partisan power. Institutional strengthening ultimately depends on the depth and integrity of deliberative processes embedded in the realities of coalitions.

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